In sum, I argue that most acts --excluding those regarding God exclusively, such as blasphemy --can be sufficiently although not entirely evaluated independently of reference to God. Thus, to evaluate most acts sufficiently, reference to God is not necessary. Also, given disputes about God's existence, God's nature, and about the appropriate role for beliefs about God in the public deliberations of a pluralistic society such as ours, claims relating God and bioethical issues ought to be avoided. Such claims do not resolve disagreement. For they increase rather than decrease disagreement by introducing a topic, namely, God, about which there is more profound disagreement than attends disputed bioethical matters. Moreover, such claims ultimately depend on God (like the truths of mathematics and physics), not all proximately depend upon God --indeed, most do not. Thus, it is false to say that if God were not to exist then nothing would be prohibited. This is just as false as saying that if God were not to exist, the interior angles of a triangle would not equal two right angles, or that if God were not to exist, 2 + 2 4. That is, if the only thing changed about reality is God's existence, there would still be ethical truths and these ethical truths would include truths about morally prohibited actions such as slavery and morally required actions such as caring for one's children or feeding the hungry.
For example, if God were not to exist, one still must not kill and eat another human being because of what human beings are: agents having will and reason and the capacity to direct themselves to means and ends. This is as true as saying that, if God were not to exist the Pythagorean Theorem would still be true. Just as the Pythagorean theorem is true in itself, on its own, independently of its relation to God or to God's existence, so also, most ethical truths are true independently of God's existence or non-existence.
Why most? Some ethical truths do immediately and entirely depend on God. Judging the rightness or wrongness of such acts requires reference to God. Such acts directly concern our relationship to God: worshiping God, being grateful to God, seeking God's friendship, not blaspheming God, and so on. This class of acts concerns our relationship with God. To this extent, their evaluation does immediately and entirely depend on reference to God. My position, which I will turn to shortly, is that most matters in bioethics do not depend proximately and entirely on God, because God is not the exclusive subject of the acts contemplated in bioethics.
The thus far unexplained distinction between proximate and ultimate dependence requires elucidation.
Picture a nun teaching high school students geometry. The nun asks: "Why are the interior angles of a triangle equal to two right angles?" and an unprepared student responds, "because God made it that way, sister." The student refers to an ultimate dependency --one which the nun acknowledges. Nonetheless, the student receives no credit for such an answer.
Nuns demand proximate causes. Characteristically, that upon which something ultimately depends will be that upon which many other things also depend while that upon which something proximately depends will not be that upon which many other things depend.
Accordingly, answers referring to the proximate cause answer very few questions while answers referring to the ultimate cause answer a multitude of questions. "God wants it that way" and "God made it so" answer myriad questions; e.g., "why does it rain?" or "why ought we not kill and eat other humans?"
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Returning to the question relating God and ethics, if ethics proximately depended on something about God --e.g., God's will --then in understanding why one ought not to do some act, such as enslave another, or in saying why one ought to do some act, such as pay one's bills, one would answer: Because God says so, or wants it. Call this a Divine Ethical Theory:
according to it, an act is required or prohibited because of something exclusively about God. God as Creator. Part of the wrongness of these acts is located in the proximate relation between the Creator and the created, but not all of it can be. For to locate all of the wrongness of some act the subject of which is not God in the relation to the Creator would be to evacuate that subject of value. While blasphemy or other acts concerning how we treat God can be wrong solely in terms of how we treat God as a subject, this is not the case in bioethical matters. For, bioethics evaluates the treatment of subjects other than God. Thus, while there are cases in which an act is right or wrong based entirely upon how it treats God, such cases will not occur in bioethics insofar as there is always some subject other than God, a zygote, an embryo, a mature human being, non-human animals, and so on, about whose treatment we debate. Since God is not the only one affected by the acts considered in bioethics, references to God are not necessary. This, of course, does not mean that they are not true; I, for one, hold that they often are. Nonetheless, given the controversial character of the role of beliefs about God in our public deliberations, references to God are typically not helpful in bioethical disputes. For, in public debates, more disagreement attends beliefs about God and what role, if any, such beliefs ought to have in public policy than attends the disputed bioethical question. Accordingly, bringing such beliefs into the debate makes for more, rather than less disagreement. Moreover, it renders one's own position unnecessarily weak insofar as it may be dismissed as entirely religious and, as it were, ruled out of bounds by those who would exclude religious reasons from public discourse altogether. Of course, disputants in such matters should seek not agreement, but the truth. I have given reasons to hold that the truth in bioethical matters does not entirely depend proximately on God;
therefore, it should not be presented as if it did.
